Will the minimum wage decision help the government?

The industrial relations scare campaign isn’t going so well. Not only are jobs being created at a surprisingly fast rate, but now the Australian Fair Pay Commission has delivered a pay increase for minimum wage workers that nearly equalled what was, presumably, the union ambit claim. ACTU Secretary Greg Combet is describing it as a

a slap in the face for the government and the business community, which had wanted a smaller increase.

It’s certainly bad news for business, which must pay the higher rates, and perhaps some unemployed people who will be priced out of the labour market. But politically it is good news for the government, in the face of persistently negative polling on their reforms

As I noted in several Catallaxy posts, public opinion on the IR reforms has been remarkably stable – people made up their minds very early on, and nothing either side said seems to have produced any real net change. The interesting question now is whether as information contradicting union/ALP scare campaigns mounts it will start to reduce the proportion of voters opposing the reforms.

Can someone who abuses ‘Lebs’ not be a racist?

Yesterday, Marcus Kapitza lost an appeal against a jail sentence for his part in the Cronulla riots. What seemed to have landed him in most trouble was this:

Kapitza threw punches at two Middle Eastern youths on the day of the riot, and was also at the Cronulla railway station when two other youths travelling on a train were set upon by a mob. Kapitza was hitting his hands against the windows of the train, shouting “f*** off, f*** off Lebs, f*** the Lebs”, which encouraged those carrying out the attack inside the train, Judge Peter Berman said.

The SMH version of the story also rather coyly tells us that on the day he was wearing a singlet with a “slogan that insulted Mohammed”, but in less Muslim Melbourne The Age tells us what it actually said, that according to Kapitza “Mohammed was a camel raping faggot”.

Curiously, one thing that concerns Kapitza about the media coverage of his words and actions is that:

“It has portrayed me as a racist, which I am not,” he told the court.

Perhaps, as several commenters think about Gary Anderton, Kapitza is just saying this in an attempt to salvage what little is left of the reputation of a person the judge said was “otherwise a man of good character”. But it depends what you mean by “racist”. There is a tendency to think of racists as people with a generalised dislike of the “Other”, as our friends in the Arts faculty would say. But the survey evidence suggests that specific likes and dislikes without any overarching theory of ethnic differences are more common – prejudices rather than “racism”, with its implications of a doctrine like liberalism, socialism, or even “anti-racism”. Kapitza, like many of the other Cronulla rioters, seems to have been angry at a “few things some members of the Lebanese community have said over the years”. The Australian way of life was under attack, he told the court, and he chose the slogan as an “eye for an eye”.

Recently I read Ian Buruma’s new book, Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance. As well as discussing van Gogh’s murder at the hands of an a Dutch-Moroccan Islamist, he writes about Pim Fortuyn, also murdered for his political beliefs (though not by an Islamist). Fortuyn was a populist opponent of Muslim immigration, but became angry when he was accused of being racist. His opposition to Islam began when Muslim youths broke the windows and threatened the clientele of a gay bar he frequented – even though he was a sociology professor, like Kapitza he was motivated by specific circumstances, not general theories. But he, like Kapitza, drew the conclusion that a way of life – the Dutch way of tolerance – was under threat.

I’m glad Kapitza has gone to jail; that we settle our disputes peacefully is fundamental to the “Australian way of life”. But I think it is plausible that he is not a racist in any general sense; that his views are inferences from the behavior of specific groups of people, rather than judging specific groups based on general theories. That Kapitza does not like ‘Lebs’ doesn’t tell us anything useful about what he thinks of any other ethnic group.

Same conclusion, different spin

Backlash: Bracks risks losing 16 seats, Poll finds ALP is out of touch
– headline in print edition of the Melbourne Herald Sun, 24 October 2006

Libs face crushing loss at poll: One in eight to vote for Greens
– headline in print edition of the Melbourne Age, 24 October 2006

Two rather different interpretations of poll results showing that we are on track to the expected Victorian election outcome – the return of the Bracks government with a slightly lower share of the vote. The actual two-party preferred estimates are from ACNielsen in The Age, Labor 56, Liberal-National (though there is not actually a Coalition agreement) 44; and from Galaxy in the Herald Sun Labor 52, Liberal-National 48.

The major difference between the two polls is their assessment of the minor party and independent vote, 12% according to Galaxy and 18% according to ACNielsen. Galaxy puts the Greens at 7% and ACNielsen at nearly double that, 13%. Because Greens preference to Labor, the ALP ends up with a larger 2-party preferred vote in the ACNielsen poll.

Galaxy puts its margin of error at +/-3.5%, and ACNielsen at +/-3%. They are both going to need all their margins of error, Galaxy up, ACNielsen down, to reconcile the different estimates of the Green vote.

Update: Newspoll’s Victorian election poll is in The Australian today (a small amount of information is online). It’s midway between Galaxy and ACNeilsen on the 2-party preferred, 54-46. It puts the Greens at 7%, the same as Galaxy, and the same as the Morgan Poll in September. Yesterday in comments, Pollwatcher thought that Galaxy’s low result might have been because they did not read out the Greens as an option, but Newspoll seems to have done so by asking ‘which one of the following would you vote for?’ with the Greens appearing in their table with all other minor parties in ‘other’. However the actual Green vote in 2002 was about mid-way between yesterday’s polls, on 9.7%. I’d guess that actual Green support is closer to 7%, but if they campaign more effectively than other minor parties and independents they will pick some of the stray uncommitted and protest voters.

A truly civil society

In our recent discussion of Robert Putnam’s ethnic diversity and distrust research, Eva Cox had this to say:

I suspect also the lack of bridging social capital in such diverse areas may also be fired by too much neo-liberal emphasis on markets that place risk on individuals, encourages self interest and undermines social cohesion.

This is an argument Eva has been pushing for more than a decade, with most publicity surrounding her 1995 Boyer Lectures ‘A Truly Civil Society’, later published as a book of the same name, which I gave a rather harsh review in the March 1996 issue of Quadrant.

Eva took a contrary position in the social capital and trust debate of the time. When most other writers were emphasising the bottom-up nature of these social phenomena, Eva took the top-down view – they would be increased by more state activity rather than less. One chapter is even called ‘The Companionable State’. People acting freely without the state could be bad. ‘Competing marketers in head-on battle destroy society’, she told us, to no doubt much nodding of heads in Glebe and Fitzroy.

There are many of us who feel pessimistic about the future, who feel society is gradually coming apart at the seams. The idea of the social is losing ground to the concepts of competition, and the money markets are replacing governments. The social aspects of humanity have somehow disappeared…

A decade on Eva’s pessimism seems distinctly misplaced. In a chapter she wrote for Robert Putnam’s Democracies in Flux she reported on the standard interpersonal trust question for 1983 and 1995, in which 46% and 39% respectively thought that most people can be trusted. In 2005 it was up to 53%. There is other evidence suggesting that our social capital is improving. The Giving Australia research project reported that volunteering and donations had both increased since the 1990s.

Other aspects of Eva’s theories have also been discredited. ‘Telling us not to trust government spills over into not trusting our neighbours or even ourselves’, she said. Yet it now seems that to the extent that there is spillover in trust between spheres of life it goes the other way, that trust at a local level leads to trust in government. She thought that ‘ever longer hours of paid work’ put social capital at risk, but HILDA has shown that people who work long hours tend to be better connected than those who work shorter hours, and those with the most time – the unemployed – suffer worst from social isolation.

As I pointed out back in 1996, Eva does not understand markets – that they are fundamentally an other-person orientated institution, which promote co-operation with customers and within firms. And to the extent that markets do allow self-interest space, there is little reason to believe that this encourages people to act self-interestedly in spheres of life where that is not appropriate. Even having babies and raising children, the most generous thing most people will ever do, is on the rise again.

One change over the last decade makes me hesitate to declare complete victory. This is that, in line with the broad ideological thrust of a A Truly Civil Society, the Howard government has been on a huge spending spree. Interestingly, much of that has been directed through the institutions of civil society, in family benefits and the outsourcing of services (Eva would presumably prefer direct government control). I think this trend has worrying long-term implications in the politicisation and bureaucratisation of non-government institutions. But perhaps in some way it may have contributed to the good social results we have seen since the 1995 Boyer lectures.

Once a racist, always a racist?

The Age thinks that Gary Anderton, the 24 year old Liberal candidate for the safe Labor seat of Lyndhurst in the upcoming Victorian election, should lose his preselection. Some blog remarks a couple of years ago, as reported on the newspaper’s front page yesterday (it was a very slow news day – that some of the thousands of letters written to the Immigration Minister on particular cases came from Alan Jones was the laughable lead story), are the problem. I reproduce the worst of it here:

Mr Anderton tells in an entry called “Anglo-Saxon Doctor Please” of going to the GP and being seen by “an Indian doctor, of all things, that absolutely stunk and obviously received a full fee degree. In other words, (he had) no idea.”
After asking the clinic for an “Australian doctor, that could speak English and was youngish (hopefully female)”, he was treated by an “Asain (sic), male, 50s, and had a speech lingo (sic) as good as Melbourne Lord Mayor (John) So”. …

“I could go back to genetics

Could political distrust lead to small government?

[Restored from NLA site]

Over at his blog, Andrew Leigh asks a question he previously discussed in more detail in a book he co-edited, The Prince’s New Clothes: Why Do Australians Dislike Their Politicians?:

If you???re a classic small-government conservative, rising distrust of politicians is consistent with the Reaganesque ???government isn???t the solution, it???s the problem??? message.

I can see the logic, but it just hasn’t happened. There doesn’t seem to be any relationship between trust in politicians and attitudes on the size of government. For example, in the Roy Morgan series of polls on the ethics and honesty of various occupational groups, politicians have consistently done badly. Last year just 15% of voter rated them highly for ethics and honesty. And would we trust such rogues with our money? Yes! 68% of us would rather the politicians spend the surplus than give it back to us so that we can spend it ourselves.

The Roy Morgan survey is a bit demanding, wanting high or very high ratings. A better question has been asked in the Australian Election Survey, which asks whether people in government are looking after themselves or whether they can be ‘trusted to do the right thing nearly all the time’? With both ‘usually can be trusted’ and ’sometimes can be trusted’ options, in 2004 40% of respondents thought the politicans could at least sometimes be trusted. But that still leaves quite a few people who seemingly think that politicians are unstrustworthy and that they should spend surpluses rather than give them back.

Why has this happened? One theory, which I have advanced in Catallaxy posts that are inaccessible due to their server problems, is that the claimed distrust of politicians is a bit of a pose; a cliched response to questions about trust, but not actually an operational assumption when people think about politics. We can see this in higher trustworthiness ratings for specific politicians than politicians in general, and arguably it is showing up here as well.
Continue reading “Could political distrust lead to small government?”

Catallaxy

Catallaxy is my biggest source of referrals, so I presume we have quite a few overlapping readers who will have noticed that it has been down, with server problems apparently. It’s now back in very primitive form, without any substantive posts yet or its archive (I hope that is recovered – my posts here would be even longer than they are if I could not link back to old posts that support elements of my argument). But Tom seems hopeful that things will be back to normal soon.

Update: There are now a few substantive posts to check out.

What is happening in undergraduate enrolments?

Yesterday the Department of Education released the 2005 financial reports (pdf) for publicly-funded universities. According to Catherine Armitage’s report in this morning’s Higher Education Supplement:

THE so-called Nelson reforms appear to have undershot their potential to fill university coffers, with local undergraduate fee-paying places earning universities just $103.7 million, or 0.7 per cent of revenue, in 2005, the first year in which looser regulation of local fee places took effect.

I’m not so sure that this is the right take on 2005’s finances. On my calculations, up-front revenue from Australian full-fee undergraduates is up a healthy 9.8%, but this is not counting the people who deferred their payments through the FEE-HELP loans scheme, which was the most important element of the Nelson reforms. This is where it gets hard to work out what is going on, because FEE-HELP covers both undergraduate and postgraduate fee-payers.

However, we can take an educated guess. FEE-HELP’s predecessor, PELS, was available only to postgraduates. FEE-HELP lending in 2005 was 21.7% higher than PELS lending in 2004. We already know from aggregate enrolment data (pdf) that postgraduate enrolments overall were stable. This suggests that most of that lending growth was in the undergraduate market. It’s possible that undergraduate full-fee revenue is in fact up by 40% or more.

Another aspect of the financial data pointing to growth in the undergraduate full-fee market is the surprisingly low growth in revenue from Commonwealth-supported students. On my calculations, it is only 3.1%. Given that this was the first year of the 25% increase in student contributions that many universities imposed (though only to commencing students), and that there was normal indexation (about 2%) on students from previous years, it should have been more.

The only ways I can think of to explain this are that the total number of Commonwealth-supported students was down and/or there was some shift in the discipline mix toward lower-revenue places. I think the former explanation is likely to be the main one as we know that total undergraduate enrolments increased by just .9%.

My interpretation: Commonwealth-supported undergraduate enrolments actually went down for the third year in a row, and all the growth was generated in the full-fee market. As has been the case for a number of years, the private education market is propping up the dysfunctional public higher education system. Little wonder the government seems to be endlessly stalling releasing the full student enrolment data that would tell us what is really going on.

Were the 1980s the ‘last great period of reform’?

It’s common enough in right-of-centre circles to laud the economic reforms of the 1980s. A new publication from the Institute of Public Affairs, Australia Since the 1980s, is in this tradition. Its opening paragraph tells us that it is

worthwhile revisiting the last great period of reform – the 1980s.

Certainly, there were some worthwhile reforms in the 1980s: the floating of the dollar, the opening up of the financial system, and the start of phased tariff cuts among them. Yet as with some other recent IPA excursions into history (here and here), this claim doesn’t quite stack up.

The 1990s, and especially their first half, have a better claim on being the last great period of reform: the end of the two airline policy, the end of the one phone company policy, improved competition policy (admittedly, a point of dispute among liberals), more phased tariff cuts, all the major privatisations, the most significant industrial relations changes, and many other less high-profile reforms. This Industry Commission publication gives a useful timeline from the 1970s to 1997.

So why do people keep talking about the 1980s as the period of reform? There are several possible explanations. It was certainly the start of a major period of reform, the unravelling of the ‘Australian Settlement’ that had governed economic policy since the first decade of the 20th century. And arguably it is a little artificial to distinguish between the two decades; the ‘1980s’ can be used figuratively to refer to later, related periods too (just as some of the important trends of the ‘1960s’ peaked in the first half of the 1970s).

But I think there could be other reasons relating to the culture of the right. The 1980s was the time when the right was on the intellectual offensive, and the left shell-shocked. In Australia, they simply weren’t used to the right having a specific programme of reform. In 1987, an edited collection from various Labor and left figures, The New Right’s Australian Fantasy, said on the back cover that its contributors ‘feel strongly about the need to safeguard what is best about this place.’ The left being reduced to a conservative argument like this was something few people would have predicted 15 years earlier, when the left’s time seem to have come. This first phase of economic reform, superbly recorded in Paul Kelly’s The End of Certainty, was as exciting for the right as it was depressing for the left.

Though the reform programme continued even more quickly in the 1990s, the political dynamic changed. The dreadful early 1990s recession gave the opponents of economic reform a plausible (if wrong) argument that the economic reform programme was a failure, and vocal opposition arose from conservatives as well as leftists. The Paul Keating Prime Ministership also divided the right. Many pro-economic reform cultural conservatives hated his non-economic agenda so much that they could barely give him credit for the good things he was doing. And then he defeated Liberal leader John Hewson and his radical reform agenda Fightback! in the 1993 election. The reform movement didn’t die with Fightback!, but it marked the end of manifesto politics. So while the 1990s were important years for economic reform, they didn’t feel as good as the 1980s had.

Surveys suggest that people tend to look back fondly on their years of early adulthood, and I think the same might be true of political movements as well. The future remains an exciting possibility, free of the messy realities of trying to make things work. This is why the free-market right views the ‘1980s’ with nostalgia. But we should not pretend that these memories are accurate history.

Can ‘people’ usually be trusted?

In his paper on ethnic diversity and interpersonal trust, Andrew Leigh remarks that:

‘At the very least, trust appears to be a useful proxy variable for a variety of outcomes that are important to economists.’

And not just economists. But the note of caution in this statement is warranted. We can, I think, say fairly confidently that high levels of stated interpersonal trust are likely to be a good thing, but that lower levels are ambiguous – they might be a sign of trouble, but there are other possible interpretations.

One reason is the wording of the question. In the survey Andrew used, the 1997-98 Australian Community Survey, he coded as ‘trusting’ people who disagreed with the statement ‘generally speaking, you can’t be too careful in dealing with most Australians.’ That’s a common wording in the surveys on trust, but it seems to force people into a trust/don’t trust choice, precluding more nuanced responses. Trust/distrust is more like a continuum from naivety to paranoia about others than a simple choice between one or the other.

We can see the effects of more nuanced answer options in the 2005 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (available here, though it is a user-unfriendly website). It has the same wording as the ACS, except that ‘Australians’ is replaced with ‘people’. Only small proportions are naive or paranoid – 2% saying that people can almost always be trusted, and 5% saying ‘almost always’ you can’t be too careful. 52% chose ‘people can usually be trusted’, and 39% ‘usually can’t be too careful’. The year before, in the Australian Election Survey, a simple two-choice answer option (though with a slightly different question ‘most people’, rather than ‘people’) saw 53% go for the negative response, compared to 44% in the social attitudes survey. Possibly offering a more qualified ‘trusting’ option improves apparent trust levels.

The broader problem with this question is that in practice trust is contextual, and so we are usually dealing with a narrower set of circumstances and persons than ‘Australians’ or ‘people’ in general. Other polling shows that we are more trusting when we are asked about a specific person or group of persons than asked very general questions. For example, we tend to rate specific politicans more highly for trustworthiness than politicians in general; we claim not to have confidence in banks in general, but all the individual banks have mostly satisfied customers – and who thinks that the banks will steal their money?

Because trust is contextual, I’m not at all sure how I would answer the more general question about trust. Would I leave my apartment door unlocked or post my PIN on my blog? No, I wouldn’t. Would I invest my savings in a get-rich-quick scheme? Again, no. So I do not believe that people can always be trusted. But I trust shops not to rip me off and not to serve me contaminated food, even if I have never been to them before and will never go to them again. I buy things on the Internet from foreign countries. I’m almost never concerned about my personal safety. So while I know there are untrustworthy people around, I am also confident that I can avoid them in my daily business. This enables me to act as if people are trustworthy.

Saying that people can usually be trusted in answer to these poll questions means, I think, that those respondents trust the people they need to deal with. But responding negatively does not necessarily mean a respondent is completely untrusting. They could be trusting in some contexts, but not others. So if ethnic diversity causes fewer people to express trust in general this may not be much of an issue, if they still have trust where that is useful in reducing monitoring and enforcement costs. The intriuiging aspect of Putnam’s latest research, as Andrew Leigh noted, is that he seems to be suggesting that in diverse cities people are less trusting of their own ethnic group as well as other people. It will be interesting to see more evidence on that.